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I.

Introduction

The political question doctrine, once thought to have its proper
application in war and foreign policy or explicit constitutional conflicts, has
taken center stage in a strange context: tort-based climate change litigation.

*
J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of California, Hastings College of the Law,
San Francisco, California; B.A., 2008, U.C. Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, California. The
author would like to thank Professor Kara Christenson for turning her attention to
this important topic; Brent Newell of the Center on Race, Poverty and the
Environment for the opportunity to work directly on the Kivalina appeal; Debby
Cwalina Furth for her advice and guidance; and Christina Rodriguez for her support
and encouragement. The author dedicates this Note to her grandmother, Gloria
Dodd.
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Between 2005 and 2007, three district courts dismissed, in part on political
question grounds, federal common law public nuisance suits for damages
and/or injunctive relief for injuries allegedly caused as a result of climate
change. In Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company (“AEPC I”),1 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the
plaintiffs’ suit for injunctive relief to abate carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions
by several utility and energy companies, holding that such litigation posed
nonjusticiable political questions. In California v. General Motors Company
(“GMC”),2 the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California dismissed plaintiff’s claims for damages against various
automakers for their contributions to CO2 pollution and climate change on
political question grounds similar to those as AEPC I. In Comer v. Murphy Oil
Company (Comer I),3 plaintiffs’ claims for damages against energy, fossil fuel
and chemical companies for their contributions to climate change, which
plaintiffs claim led to the increased strength of Hurricane Katrina and the
subsequent destruction it caused, were also dismissed as nonjusticiable.
In 2009, the AEPC I decision was reversed by the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, holding that tort-based climate change litigation did not pose
nonjusticiable political questions.4 Yet in that same year, subsequent to the
AEPC II decision, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California dismissed the tort-based climate change litigation of Native Village
of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil (Kivalina)5 on both standing and political question
grounds.6 Kivalina, now pending appeal before the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, may predict whether the United States Supreme Court is forced to
rectify a circuit court split, or whether Congress will be forced to act because
of the increasing justiciability of tort-based climate change litigation. Given
the Second Circuit authority now in existence, this Note argues that tortbased climate change litigation does not pose nonjusticiable political
questions, and that the Ninth Circuit should follow the reasoning of the
Second Circuit in reversing the district court decision in Kivalina.
The purpose of this Note is to highlight the rapidly changing area of
tort-based climate change law, particularly insofar as the political question
doctrine is involved, and to proffer evidence in support of the Ninth Circuit
should it choose to reverse the district court decision in Kivalina. Part I of

1.
2.
3.

406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

4.
5.
6.

See Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2nd Cir. 2009).

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547 (N.D. Cal. 2007).

Transcript of Hearing on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, No. 1:05-CV-436LG-RHW (S.D. Miss. Aug 30, 2007).
663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).

This Note will focus solely on the political question grounds in the
dismissal of Kivalina.
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this Note will explain what the political question doctrine is and how it has
developed as a legal doctrine and a check on the powers of the judiciary.
This part will first address the historical background of the political question
doctrine, and then detail its progression and scope within American
jurisprudence. Part II of this Note will address the political question
doctrine in the context of tort-based climate change litigation. This part will
address the AEPC, Comer, and GMC litigation in turn, laying out the
respective district court analyses with respect to the political question
doctrine before discussing how the Second Circuit Court in AEPC II rejected
the political question arguments. Finally, Part III of this Note will address
the Kivalina litigation. This part will first lay out the district court’s reasoning
in dismissing the case partly on political question grounds, and then will
analyze the appellate briefs and discuss how the Ninth Circuit should
handle the appeal.

II.

The Political Question Doctrine

The political question doctrine is one of the few “checks” on the
judicial branch of the United States government. Its purpose lies in
restricting the judiciary to hearing issues which are not otherwise under the
purview of another branch of government, and for which the court can
adequately find a remedy.7 Cases should be dismissed as nonjusticiable
where the dispute at issue violates these purposes and should be settled
through the political functions of the executive and legislative branches of
government.8 This restraint on the judiciary is to some extent self-imposed,
as a result of Marbury v. Madison (Marbury),9 to some extent mandated by the
structure of government laid out in Articles I – III of the United States
Constitution10 and to some extent a result of the developed “case or
controversy” requirement for the judiciary stemming solely from Article III.11
After briefly laying out the historical progression of the political
question doctrine in American jurisprudence, this Note will address the

7.

See HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW, 11-14
(1961); ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS, 125-26 (1986).

8. Kimberly Breedon, Remedial Problems at the Intersection of the Political Question
Doctrine, the Standing Doctrine, and the Doctrine of Equitable Discretion, 34 OHIO N.U.L. REV.
523 (2008) (hereinafter Breedon); see also LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS, 284 (2d ed.
2003).
9.
10.
11.

5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803).
U.S. Const. arts. I-III.

Id.; see also Trevor Cutaiar, Lane ex rel. Lane v. Halliburton: The Fifth Circuit’s
Recent Treatment of the Political Question Doctrine and What it Could Mean for Comer v.
Murphy Oil, 55 LOY. L. REV. 393 (2009) (hereinafter Cutaiar).
41
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most well-known political question case, Baker v. Carr (Baker),12 and the
perceived scope of the political question doctrine. In particular, those
opinions that support the idea of a limited scope and use of the political
questions doctrine as a means for dismissing cases before getting to their
merits will be highlighted.

A.

Marbury v. Madison and the Classical/Prudential Divide

In Marbury v. Madison, the Court sought to resolve a dispute over a
commission promised to Marbury to serve as a justice of the peace but
withheld from him after a change in presidential administration.13 In writing
the opinion for the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall distinguished between
individual issues and rights on the one hand, and national issues on the
other.14 Chief Justice Marshall stated that “[q]uestions, in their nature
political [by virtue of pertaining to the nation and not individual rights],15 or
which are, by the [C]onstitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can
never be made in this [C]ourt.”16 The structure the Court was espousing was
one where claims invoking individual rights and not challenging decisions
made by the other branches under their discretionary functions are not
political and are thereby justiciable.17 As Chief Justice Marshall saw it, “[t]he
province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to
enquire [sic] how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in
which they have a discretion.”18 This limited structure, inspired by and
consistent with the principles of separation of powers inherent in the
Constitution, constitutes the genesis of the political question doctrine.19
Whatever else Chief Justice Marshall accomplished in Marbury, he
failed to lay out guidelines for applying the concept of the political question
to other cases. Courts following the Marbury decision had very little to go on
in determining whether a case invoked the political question doctrine. As a
result, scholars have identified two distinct strands of the political question
doctrine that have developed: the classical and the prudential.20 The

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
5 U.S. at 140.
Id. at 166.
Id.
Id. at 170.
Breedon, supra note 8, at 527.
5 U.S. at 170.
See U.S. Const. arts I-III; Cutaiar, supra note 11, at 398.

See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002)
(hereinafter Barkow).
42
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classical strand has its “foundation in the text, structure, and history of the
Constitution itself,” much like Chief Justice Marshall’s formulation in
Marbury.21
The prudential strand, on the other hand, does not involve
constitutional interpretation but rather is a judge-made overlay used to
avoid conflicts with the other branches and to avoid embarrassment.22
Courts have used this prudential strand of the doctrine “to delegate judicial
authority to political actors (even when the Constitution does not
contemplate such a delegation) and to avoid deciding controversial cases.”23
This prudential strand grew largely out of the interpretative vacuum left after
Marbury,24 and it often involves courts looking not to the text of the
Constitution itself, but rather to the consequences of the case in
contemplating whether a political question exists.25 With the rise of the
prudential political question doctrine comes the fear that a court may
“[avoid] a case simply because it believes the issue is too complicated or
too politically charged.”26

B.

The Scope of the Political Question Doctrine

The Court failed to lay out a more detailed structure for the case or
controversy requirement until Baker v. Carr in 1962.27 In Baker, the Court held
that a political question will be found if any one of the following factors is
present in a case:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4]
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 253.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 258.
Id.; see, e.g., Cutaiar, supra note 11, at 399.
Id. at 263.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 186.
43
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embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.28
Notably, the Baker factors take into account both the classical and the
prudential strands of the political question doctrine.29 The first two factors
are grounded in the text of the Constitution and the duties of the judiciary,
thereby recognizing the classical strand.30 The other four factors are largely
based in the discretion of the courts and the context of the cases themselves
rather than constitutional text, and therefore recognize the prudential
strand.31
The Baker factors, by themselves, provide clearer but still incomplete
information as to the scope of the political question doctrine. The Court in
Baker appears, however, to have envisioned a narrowed scope for the
doctrine.32 The Court stated that it is separation of powers concerns, not
merely political undertones, which give rise to a political question.33 The
Court distinguished between cases which pose actual political questions
and those that are political cases as a whole, and made clear that only the
former are nonjusticiable.34
This distinction between political cases and political questions has
been echoed in other cases as well. In Japan Whaling Association v. American
Cetacean Society (Japan Whaling), for example, the Court rejected the Japan
Whaling Association’s claim that the sixth Baker factor was invoked because
the issues involved foreign relations and an international agreement.35 The
case involved a claim by environmental groups that the Japan Whaling
Association had violated the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling.36 The Court held that statutory interpretation is a judicial function
and that it was unable to “shirk this responsibility merely because [the]
decision may have significant political overtones.”37
In Powell v. McCormack, the Court again struck down a political question
defense.38 There, the House of Representatives refused to seat the newly

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
44

Id. at 217.
Barkow, supra note 20, at 265.
Id.; see e.g. Cutaiar, supra note 11, at 401.
Id.
See Breedon, supra note 8, at 528.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 210.
Id. at 210-11; see e.g. Breedon, supra note 8, at 529.
478 U.S. 221, 229 (1986).
Id. at 224.
Id. at 229-30.
395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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elected Powell for lack of qualification.39 The defendant Speaker of the
House claimed that, because determining qualifications of Representatives
was textually committed to the House by the Constitution, this was a
political question.40 The Court disagreed, stating that there was only a
textual commitment to the House to judge certain specifically expressed
qualifications, not all.41 The Court noted, importantly for the purpose of this
Note, that “[our] government requires that federal courts on occasion
interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction
given the document by another branch . . . [but that this] alleged conflict
that such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts’ avoiding their
constitutional responsibility.”42
The jurisprudence applying the political question doctrine to dismiss a
case is overwhelmingly tied to a limited set of subjects: voting rights and
political gerrymandering,43 issues involving treaties and the authority tied to
treaty-making,44 issues involving war and associated strategies,45 and specific
areas of foreign policy.46 This suggests that the scope is likewise meant to
be limited, and poses interesting questions and difficult problems in the
case of tort-based climate change litigation, for which there is little
analogous case law.47

C.

The Second and Third Baker Factors

Of the six factors the Court identified in Baker as being tied to political
questions, the second and third have been most commonly invoked in

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 492.
Id. at 513.
Id. at 520-21.
Id. at 549.

See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (Vieth) (holding that political
gerrymandering cases are not justiciable).

44. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (Goldwater) (holding that the
President’s power to terminate a treaty was non-justiciable in that instance); see also,
Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 221 (holding that the Court could interpret treaties and
executive agreements without political question bar).
45. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that the
method of sharing war-making powers between the legislative and executive
branches is non-justiciable).
46. Erin C. Borissov, Global Warming: A Questionable Use of the Political
Question Doctrine, 41 IND. L. REV. 415, 439 (2008).
47. Id. at 440, n.210 (stating that all domestic controversies in which the
United States Supreme Court has found a political question have involved an explicit
constitutional issue.)
45
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dismissals of tort-based climate change litigation as political questions.48
As such, it is important to understand the progression of these specific Baker
factors in jurisprudence.
The second Baker factor precludes a court from adjudicating where
there is a “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards” for
resolving the case before it.49 There is agreement among most scholars that
the underlying requirement of this factor is to “construe the Constitution to
discover the criteria for deciding the issue in question to determine whether
‘the judicial tests through which constitutional norms are enforced’ are
manageable.”50 The recent case of Vieth v. Jubelirer (Vieth) sheds some light on
what may or may not be manageable.
Vieth involved a claim of equal protection violations with respect to
partisan gerrymandering.51 The Court unanimously found that the Equal
Protection Clause forbids partisan gerrymandering that excessively
disadvantages a political party, but was unable to agree on the standard that
should be used to determine whether a particular gerrymander violates the
Equal Protection Clause.52 Since there was no applicable standard in the
Constitution or in case law, a plurality of the Court would have “declared
equal protection challenges to political gerrymandering nonjusticiable on
political question grounds.”53
What this suggests is that the second Baker factor “does not mean that
the difficulty lies so much in crafting a judicial remedy as in identifying what
the law requires and whether those requirements have been met.”54 So long
as there are standards for resolving the particular case in front of the court,
i.e., a clear picture of the law at hand and what would constitute a violation
of it, the case should not be dismissed as a political question using the

48. See AEPC I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272 (finding the third Baker factor
“particularly pertinent” to its discussion); Comer, 585 F.3d at 860 (citing to district
court transcripts which indicate that the case was dismissed because adjudicating
would require “an initial policy determination of a kind which is simply nonjudicial”);
GMC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547 at 18 (stating that the third Baker factor “largely
controls the analysis in the current case”); Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876 (holding
that the second and third Baker factors “preclude judicial consideration” of the
claims).
49.
50.

Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.

51.
52.
53.
54.

Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267.

Breedon, supra note 8, at 537 (quoting in part Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Judicially Mangeable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274,
1281 (2006)).

46

Id.; see also Breedon, supra note 8, at 537.
Breedon, supra note 8, at 534.
Id. at 535; see also Fallon, supra note 50, at 1281-97.
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second Baker factor.55 Regardless of what broader implications the idea
behind a particular case ruling may have, the second Baker factor focuses on
the actual claim at issue and whether the judicial branch is the most
appropriate vehicle for resolution of the issue.56
The third Baker factor precludes a court from adjudicating a case where
it is impossible to decide the outcome “without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”57 Given the cases
cited in Baker to develop the six factor test,58 it would appear that the third
factor “means something other than a requirement that the political
branches identify and assign weight to broad policy considerations relevant
to the controversy” before determining entitlement to relief.59 The more
appropriate basis for the third factor is an inquiry into “whether a particular
and discrete diplomatic determination by a political branch about a party to,
or fact in, the specific controversy . . . must be made before the court can
decide the legal issues.”60
The open-endedness of the third factor, however, easily lends itself to
overbroad application. Courts’ aversion to “regulation through litigation”61
can result in their dismissal of cases that seem too politically charged,
controversial, or complicated.62 Yet it is important to remember the
following: First, courts may always be overridden by the political branches
through legislation, thereby rectifying any judicial policy decision that is

55.
56.

Id.; see also Breedon, supra note 8, at 538.

57.
58.

Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.

59.
60.
61.

Breedon, supra note 8, at 539.

62.

Thorpe, supra note 61, at 88.

Breedon, supra note 8, at 538; see also Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission
Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 684 (E.D. La. 2006) (noting that tort actions have clear
standards rendering the second Baker factor inappropriate); Doe v. Exxon-Mobil, 473
F.3d 345, 354-55 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that tort actions are “constitutionally
committed to the judiciary”).
See Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. 635 (1850) (holding that courts cannot interpret
interests protected by a treaty until the executive branch first determines whether
such a treaty is in effect); Ex parte Hitz, 111 U.S. 766 (1884) (holding that courts cannot
recognize diplomatic privilege until the executive determines diplomatic status).
Id.

Amelia Thorpe, Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation and the Political Question
Doctrine, 24 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 79, 88 (2008) (A concept that emerged as a result
of the tobacco litigation of the 1990s, where some commentators saw tobacco suits
as representing a “new, undesirable genre of litigation in which the courts are taking
on broad policy problems best left to legislatures.”) (hereinafter Thorpe); see also W.
Kip Viscusi, A Postmortem on the Cigarette Settlement, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 523 (1999) (detailed
critique of “regulation through litigation” in the context of the tobacco litigation).

47

West

Northwest, Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter 2011

disfavored by the other branches; second, since questions of bias and
expertise can be raised against all members of all branches, not just the
judiciary, it may in fact be beneficial to have all three branches involved in
some policy-making; and third, judges do, in fact, make policy decisions on
a daily basis.63

III. The Political Question Doctrine and Tort-Based Climate
Change Litigation
Since 2005, the political question doctrine has emerged as a
significant hurdle for litigants to overcome with regard to climate change
litigation. Where once the doctrine proved a complete barrier, the recent
decision by the Second Circuit suggests that the political question doctrine
has in fact been misapplied to tort-based climate change litigation.64 This
part of the Note will address the recent uses of the political question
doctrine as a bar to climate change regulation at the district court level and
subsequent analysis of the Second Circuit decision which reversed the lower
court decision in AEPC I.

D.

The Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company
Litigation: Part I

In 2005, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. (“AEPC I”) dismissed a
public nuisance suit on political question grounds.65 The suit, which was the
first of its kind, was brought by a contingent of eight states and three public
land trusts against six of the largest electric utility companies in the
nation.66 The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to abate the utility
companies’ CO2 emissions, citing these emissions as significant
contributions to global warming.67 Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that
defendants’ emissions constituted 25 percent of the U.S. electric power
sector’s CO2 emissions; that CO2 is the primary greenhouse gas responsible
for global warming; and that because of the defendants’ significant
contributions to global warming, irreparable harm will be done to property
in New York state and the health, safety, and well-being of the citizens of the
state is in jeopardy.68 The defendants moved to dismiss the claims for lack

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
48

Id. at 89-90.
See AEPC II, 582 F.3d 309.
AEPC I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 267.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 268.
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of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.69
In determining whether the case could be resolved without an initial
policy determination of a nonjudicial nature, the district court focused
primarily on the third Baker factor.70 If the case could not be resolved
without an initial policy determination, it must be dismissed on political
question grounds. Citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC (Chevron),71 the district
court held that balancing the plaintiffs’ interests in rapid pollution reduction
with the economic and industrial importance of the electric power sector is
“impossible without an ‘initial policy determination’ first having been made
by the elected branches to which our system commits such policy decisions,
viz., Congress and the President.”72 Hailing the “transcendently legislative
nature”73 of the litigation, the court stated that the relief requested by
plaintiffs would require them, at minimum, to:
(1) Determine the appropriate level at which to cap the carbon
dioxide emissions of these Defendants; (2) determine the
appropriate percentage reduction to impose upon Defendants;
(3) create a schedule to implement those reductions; (4)
determine and balance the implications of such relief on the
United States’ ongoing negotiations with other nations
concerning global climate change; (5) assess and measure
available alternative energy resources; and (6) determine and
balance the implications of such relief on the United States’
energy sufficiency and thus its national security . . . .74
The court then listed various policy determinations that would be
required before any court could address these issues, including: economic
implications, implications for energy independence and national security,
and how the costs of such injunctive relief should be borne.75
Finally, the court cited numerous statements of the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) dealing with the issue of global warming, as well
as “the explicit statements of Congress and the Executive on the issue of

69.
70.
71.

Id. at 267.

72.
73.
74.
75.

AEPC I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272.

Id. at 272.

467 U.S. 837, 847 (1984) (stating that, in air pollution cases, courts must
balance “interests seeking strict schemes to reduce pollution rapidly to eliminate its
social costs and interests advancing the economic concern that strict schemes [will]
retard industrial development with attendant social costs.”).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 273.
49
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global climate change in general and their specific refusal to impose the
limits on carbon dioxide emissions Plaintiffs now seek to impose by judicial
fiat,” as confirmation that “addressing global climate change is an
undertaking for the political branches.”76 The court then held that, “because
resolution of the issues presented . . . require[d] identification and
balancing of economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national security
interests”, the third Baker factor applied and the case presented
nonjusticiable political questions.77

E.

California and the Automobile Emissions Litigation

In 2007, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California relied heavily on AEPC I in dismissing California’s public nuisance
claim for damages against automakers for creating and contributing to
global warming.78 The plaintiff in California v. General Motors Corporation
(“GMC”) claimed that defendants’ CO2 emissions constituted over 20 percent
of the nation’s emissions, and over 30 percent of the CO2 emissions in
California alone.79 Plaintiff sought damages for, inter alia, the reduction of
the snow pack in the Sierra Nevada region, increased erosion along the
coast, and the increased risk of flooding and wildfires, all under a theory of
public nuisance and all related to defendants’ contributions to global
warming.80 As in AEPC I, the defendants moved to dismiss, partly on
political question grounds.81
The court invoked the first, second and third Baker factors in
dismissing the complaint on political question grounds, stating that the
third factor was especially relevant and focusing on that analysis first.82 The
court followed the reasoning in AEPC I in rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that
there was enough well-established tort law for the court to use in making
their decision, holding that a Chevron balancing test was impossible without
an initial policy decision to be made by the elected branches.83 The court
gave three specific reasons why it would be improper for the judicial branch

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
50

Id. at 274.
Id.
GMC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547.
Id. at *3-4.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *17.
Id. at *20.
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to make such policy decisions.84 First, the court reasoned that balancing
“the competing interests of reducing global warming emissions and the
interests of advancing and preserving economic and industrial
development”85 are determinations to be made by the political branches of
the government.86 Second, citing the “prevalence of international and
national debate, and the resulting policy actions and inactions” surrounding
the concept of global warming,87 and the “broad array of domestic and
international measures that are yet undefined,”88 the court stated that a
decision allowing damages in this instance would be premature and
inappropriate.89 Finally, citing to Massachusetts v. EPA,90 the court noted that
“initial policy determinations [on the regulation of carbon dioxide] are made
by the political branches while preserving a framework for judicial review of
those determinations.”91
The GMC court also found that the first and second Baker factors were
implicated, though to a lesser degree. In finding that the case failed the first
Baker factor, a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to the
political branches of government,”92 the court focused on what it saw as the
potential implications of plaintiff’s claim on the political branches’ powers
over domestic and foreign commerce and general foreign policy.93 The court
held that, because imposing damages for public nuisance would affect
defendants’ worldwide sale of automobiles and thus “have an inextricable
effect on interstate commerce and foreign policy - issues constitutionally
committed to the political branches of government,” the first Baker factor
was applicable.94

84. Id. at *20-38; see also Morgan McCue Sport, An Inconvenient Suit: California v.
General Motors Corporation and A Look at Whether Global Warming Constitutes An Actionable
Public Nuisance or A Nonjusticiable Political Question, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 583, 625 (2007-08).
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GMC, 2007 LEXIS 68547 at *33-34 (citing Massachusetts v EPA, 549 U.S. 497
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In finding that the case failed the second Baker test, a “lack of judicially
manageable standards” for resolving the case,95 the court distinguished prior
public nuisance cases cited by the plaintiff on the ground that they failed to
“implicate a comparable number of national and international policy issues”
as are present in the case of global warming.96 The court claimed that
because there was no well-established “legal framework for assessing global
warming nuisance damages,” it was left without appropriate standards for
determining what reasonable levels of CO2 emissions might be and who
should bear the costs of a problem that has an infinite number of sources on
a global scale.97

F.

The Comer v. Murphy Oil U.S.A. Litigation

The next tort-based climate change case, Comer v. Murphy Oil, U.S.A.
(Comer I), was decided in 2007 by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi.98 Plaintiffs were members of a class action
suit, encompassing various residents and owners of property along the
Mississippi coastline that had been damaged or destroyed by Hurricane
Katrina.99 Plaintiffs claimed that the defendant energy, fossil fuel, and
chemical corporations’ emissions of greenhouse gases contributed to global
warming, which in turn increased the power of weather systems such as
hurricanes that led to the destruction of their property.100 Plaintiffs sought
both compensatory and punitive damages based on, inter alia, common-law
private and public nuisance claims.101
Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims on both standing and
political question grounds, and the court granted the motion.102 In a ruling
from the bench, the district court stated that plaintiffs’ complaint required
the court to “balance economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national
security interests and make an initial policy determination of a kind which is
simply nonjudicial.”103 Furthermore, the court held that adjudication of the
case would require developing standards that should be left to the political
branches of government, such as “the amount of greenhouse gas emissions
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Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
GMC, 2007 LEXIS 68547 at *46.
Id.
Comer I, No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss. Aug 30, 2007).

Comer v. Murphy Oil, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009) (Comer II), vacated on
unrelated grounds, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).
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that would be excessive and the scientific and policy reasons behind those
standards.”104 As such, the district court dismissed the case.105

G.

American Electric Power Company: The Second Circuit
Weighs In

In September of 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed the district court in AEPC I and held, among other
things, that plaintiffs’ actions did not present a nonjusticiable political
question.106 The court began by tracing the history of the political question
doctrine and noting that the Supreme Court has rarely in its history found
the political question to be a bar on adjudication.107 The court then took a
step-by-step approach, analyzing each Baker factor and finding them
inapplicable to the case.108
In addressing the first Baker factor, the court first noted that the
defendants argued that the issues at hand were committed to the political
branches through the Commerce Clause as a matter of “high policy.”109 The
court considered this argument waived at the outset, however, because the
defendants had failed to explain their connection of the emissions issue and
the Commerce Clause.110 Next, the court addressed the defendants’
arguments that permitting the plaintiffs’ claims to be adjudicated would
interfere with the executive authority over foreign relations and the ability to
resolve fundamental policy questions via diplomatic or other means.111 The
court disagreed with the defendants’ framing of the issue at hand, reasoning
that characterizing the lawsuit “as implicating ‘complex, inter-related and
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AEPC II, 582 F.3d 309.

In October of 2009, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court decision in Comer I and held that the case did not present nonjusticiable
political questions. See Comer II, 585 F.3d at 879. In early 2010, the Fifth Circuit
granted a rehearing en banc, which vacated the Comer II decision. See Comer v. Murphy
Oil, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010). However, “[a]fter the en banc court was properly
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not disqualified.” Comer v. Murphy Oil, 607 F.3d 1049, 1053-54 (5th Cir. 2010). The
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far-reaching policy questions about the causes of global climate change and
the most appropriate response to it’ magnifies to the outer extent the
discrete domestic nuisance issues actually presented.”112 The court pointed
out that the plaintiffs in this case had never asked for a broad solution to
global warming; rather, the plaintiffs were asking for emissions limits on the
particular domestic power plants which had allegedly caused them harm
and created a public nuisance.113 As the court noted in finding no basis for
the application of the first Baker factor:
A decision by a single federal court concerning a common law of
nuisance cause of action, brought by domestic plaintiffs against
domestic companies for domestic conduct, does not establish a
national or international emissions policy . . . [and thus] invocation
of the political question doctrine here is unwarranted because
the relief for which Plaintiffs pray applies in only the most
tangential and attenuated way to the expansive domestic and
foreign policy issues raised by Defendants.114
In addressing the second Baker factor, the court rejected defendants’
argument that the complexities involved in global warming and pollution
regulation, coupled with the “vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts
and maxims of equity gleaned from public nuisance cases or the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,”115 precluded adjudication of plaintiffs’
claims for lack of judicially manageable standards. Citing to a number of
complex public nuisance cases that were novel at the time of adjudication,116
the court noted that these were just the first “in a long line of federal
common law nuisance cases where federal courts employed familiar public
nuisance precepts, grappled with scientific evidence, and resolved the issues
presented . . . .”117 The mere fact that a case is complex, novel, or otherwise
politically charged does not automatically mean that there are no judicially
manageable standards for resolving it; instead, “[f]ederal courts have long
been up to the task of assessing complex scientific evidence in cases where
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See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (Missouri I) (public nuisance case
involving sewage discharge into the Mississippi River); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496
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sophisticated scientific and expert evidence offered” in coming to a decision).

54

West

Northwest, Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter 2011

the cause of action was based either upon the federal common law or upon
a statute.”118
Additionally, the court noted that adjudicating plaintiffs’ claims in this
case would “[n]ot involve assessing and balancing the kind of broad
interests that a legislature or a President might consider in formulating a
national emissions policy,” as suggested by the district court in AEPC I.
Rather, adjudication of the claim would require the district court to simply
“address and resolve the particular nuisance issue before it.”119 Given the
fact that there were judicially recognized standards for resolving the case
under established nuisance law, defendants were not entitled to dismissal
under the second Baker factor.120
As noted in the discussion of AEPC I, the district court relied mainly
on the third Baker factor in dismissing the case. In particular, the district
court relied on the fact that the political branches had failed to develop a
concrete policy regarding global warming, viewing “the possibility of any
regulation coming out of the courts as countering the political branches’
refusal to act.”121 The circuit court disagreed, noting that the Supreme Court
has stated that a “mere refusal to legislate . . . falls far short of an expression
of legislative intent to supplant the existing common law in [an] area,”122 and
as such plaintiffs “need not await an ‘initial policy determination’ in order to
proceed on . . . a federal common law of nuisance claim, as such claims have
been adjudicated in the federal courts for over a century.”123 Again pointing
to the fact that, at its most basic level, the case involved ordinary tort
claims, the court held that there could be no violation of the third Baker
factor.124
Finally, the court addressed the fourth, fifth, and sixth Baker factors
together in holding that no political question was present.125 The court
noted that these factors “appear to be relevant only if judicial resolution of a
question would contradict prior decisions taken by a political branch in
those limited contexts where such contradiction would seriously interfere
with important governmental interests.”126 The court held that “[a]llowing
this litigation where there is a lack of a unified policy does not demonstrate
any lack of respect for the political branches, contravene a relevant political
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decision already made, or result in multifarious pronouncements that would
embarrass the nation.”127 As such, and noting that Congress has the power
to displace common law standards through its own legislation which the
courts would then have to follow, the court held that the district court erred
in dismissing plaintiffs’ complaints on political question grounds.128

IV. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil and What
Happens Next
In September 2009, immediately after AEPC II was decided, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California issued its
decision in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil (Kivalina),129 dismissing the
case partly on political question grounds. Plaintiffs appealed the ruling to
the Ninth Circuit on November 5, 2009.

A.

Facts of Kivalina

The Native Village of Kivalina is the governing body of an Alaskan
Inupiat Eskimo village, Kivalina, home to approximately 400 residents.130
The coast of Kivalina is “protected by Arctic sea ice [in the] fall, winter and
spring . . . which acts as a barrier against coastal storms and waves that
affect the coast of the Chukchi Sea.”131 As a result of global warming, this ice
protection arrives later in the year and thins out earlier, subjecting Kivalina
to storms and waves that have had the effect of degrading the village over
time.132 As a result of the dissipation of the ice protection and subsequent
destruction of Kivalina’s land, the village is becoming uninhabitable and
“Plaintiffs allege[d] that as a result, the Village will have to be relocated at a
cost estimated to range from $95 to $400 million.”133
The plaintiffs filed suit against 24 oil, energy and utility companies,
seeking damages “under a federal common law claim of nuisance, based on
their alleged contribution to the excessive emission of carbon dioxide and

127.

Id. at 332 (citing Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 558 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“Because of a lack of a policy decision on point, we do not reach the question posed
by the fifth Baker test whether there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
thereto.”); Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione, etc., 937 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir.
1991) (“[N]o prior political decisions are questioned - or even implicated - by the
matter before us.”).
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other greenhouse gases which they claim are causing global warming.”134
The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the plaintiffs’ claims
presented nonjusticiable political questions, and further that the plaintiffs
lacked standing.135

B.

The District Court’s Reasoning

The district court began by addressing the first Baker factor.136 The
defendants argued that because Congress and the President had previously
refused to adopt emissions regulations without concessions made by
foreign countries, “allowing Plaintiffs to proceed with their global warming
claim would run afoul of the first Baker factor ‘because it would intrude upon
the political branches’ constitutionally committed authority over foreign
policy.’”137 Noting that the defendants had shown that global warming and
its related issues “may implicate foreign policy and related economic
issues”, the court stated that nevertheless “[t]he indisputably international
dimension of this particular environmental problem does not render the
instant controversy a non-justiciable one.”138 Further, the court noted that
the defendants had failed to cite any specific provision of federal law or the
Constitution which vests the final determination regarding climate change,
global warming, or emissions regulations in either of the two political
branches.139 As such, the court found the first Baker factor inapplicable.140
The court combined the second and third Baker factors under the
general inquiry of whether “resolution of the question demand[s] that a
court move beyond areas of judicial expertise.”141
With regard to the second Baker factor, the plaintiffs contended that
because this was, at the most basic level, a public nuisance case, there are
significant standards available to the court in determining whether the
defendants contributed to an unreasonable interference with the rights of
the public.142 This is the same line of reasoning put forward by the Second
Circuit in AEPC II. Here, however, the court stated that the plaintiffs
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overlooked that “whether the interference is unreasonable turns on weighing
‘the gravity of the harm against the utility of the conduct.’”143
Citing to GMC, the district court stated that it would be required to
weigh “the energy-producing alternatives that were available in the past and
consider their respective impact on far ranging issues such as their
reliability as an energy source, safety considerations and the impact of the
different alternative on consumers and business at every level.”144 From this,
the court stated that the finder of fact would then have to “weigh the
benefits derived from those choices against the risk that increasing
greenhouse gases would in turn increase the risk of causing flooding along
the coast of a remote Alaskan locale,” a task for which there are no particular
judicially discoverable and manageable standards.145
The court then addressed the plaintiffs’ argument that the existence of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for their claims is evident
in the long history of air and water pollution cases.146 First, the court
acknowledged the AEPC II decision and its reliance on this same argument,
briefly summarizing the decision.147 The court went on, however, to
distinguish the factual arguments in AEPC II from the Kivalina litigation and
critique the reasoning of the Second Circuit’s decision.148 The court
dismissed the cases cited by AEPC II and the plaintiffs, noting that the
“common thread running through each of those cases is that they involved a
discrete number of ‘polluters’ that were identified as causing a specific
injury to a specific area,” whereas here the public nuisance claim is “based
on the emission of greenhouses gases located throughout the world and
affecting the entire planet and its atmosphere.”149 The court also distinguished the
water pollution cases on the grounds that in those cases, the discharge itself
is the harm, whereas in global warming the harm derives from a series of
events disconnected from the actual discharge.150
Furthermore, in holding that the second Baker factor precluded
adjudication of the plaintiffs’ claims, the court stated that no cases could
provide any guidance on global warming nuisance, which “seeks to impose
liability and damages on a scale unlike any prior environmental pollution
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cases,” that would assist the court in reaching a resolution of the case in a
reasoned manner.151
Finally, the court addressed the third Baker factor and held that it also
precluded the plaintiffs’ claims from moving forward. The court noted two
policy determinations that the plaintiffs’ claims required before the case
could be decided: First, what would have been an acceptable level of
emissions by the defendants; and second, who should bear the coast of
global warming, considering everyone on the planet is to blame.152 The court
rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion that, because they are seeking damages
rather than injunctive relief, there is no need for the court to determine what
emissions standards should have been imposed.153 As the court noted,
“[r]egardless of the relief sought, the resolution of Plaintiffs’ nuisance claim
requires balancing the social utility of Defendants’ conduct with the harm it
inflicts”, a determination that cannot be made without the above policy
determinations being laid out first.154 As a result, the court dismissed the
plaintiffs’ claims as invoking both the second and third Baker factors.155

C.

The Appeal

In their opening brief to the Ninth Circuit, Kivalina stresses that
“[a]djudication of [the] case will not require the judiciary to engage in
legislative or executive functions . . . [but instead] will require the judiciary
to perform its core Article III role of resolving a current and real controversy
between the parties, apply common-law doctrines and determine an
appropriate damages award.”156 Following the reasoning of AEPC II, the
appeal attempts to focus the court’s attention toward this particular claim
and the historical ability of the judiciary to resolve public nuisance claims.
It is the Native Village of Kivalina at issue - not international environmental
policy, and Kivalina attacks the legal reasoning and substantive policy
decisions made by the district court in their opening papers.
Kivalina argues that “[t]he district court’s decision that [the case]
lacked judicially discoverable and manageable standards rested on two
errors: first, a legal error regarding the elements of a public nuisance claim,
and second, an error in its characterization of prior public nuisance
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pollution cases.”157 The legal error, according to Kivalina, was the district
court’s assertion that a utility/benefit balancing process was the central
question in a nuisance suit for damages.158 As Kivalina states, “the central
question in a nuisance action for damages is not one of balancing but rather
one of allocation: a court asks which party should bear the cost of the harm
that an interference has caused.”159 Kivalina then goes on to argue that the
district court improperly distinguished “prior public nuisance law as
allegedly involving a ‘discrete number of polluters that were identified as
causing a specific injury to a specific area.’”160 Here, “Kivalina is suffering
from a specific injury in a specific area - its annihilation from the very
specific location that is being wiped from the map by global warming.”161 As
Kivalina notes, the fact that there is a worldwide injury as a result of global
warming does not diminish the fact that Kivalina itself is asserting a specific
injury against a discrete set of polluters.162 Thus, according to Kivalina, the
district court improperly applied the law of nuisance and ineffectually
distinguished prior nuisance cases in determining that there were no
judicially manageable standards for resolving the case.163
Kivalina then goes on to argue that the district court erred in applying
Baker factor three - where adjudication of a case would require an initial
policy decision best left to the political branches.164 If a policy decision
would be required, the political branches have already done so by making it
official U.S. policy that greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced.165
Furthermore, decisions regarding who should pay for global warming
injuries are judicial functions, and as such the district court erred in holding
that those decisions would require political policy determinations.166 And,
finally, Kivalina notes that holding only some polluters liable and the
decision surrounding which ones to choose are not political policy
determinations, but rather “not an uncommon judicial function to hold a
subset of multiple polluters liable where pollution is widespread.”167 For the

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
60

Id. at 49.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 55.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 60.

West

Northwest, Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter 2011

reasons stated above, Kivalina argues that the district court erred in
dismissing the case on political question grounds.

D.

Looking Forward

How the Ninth Circuit will handle the appeal is very much a question
of interpretation. Since GMC was never appealed, the Ninth Circuit never
had the opportunity to weigh in on the political question aspect of the case.
And although GMC was heavily criticized by the Second Circuit in AEPC II,
the Kivalina court relied on it in dismissing the case. The question is
whether the Ninth Circuit will join the Second Circuit in reversing the district
court in Kivalina, or whether it will create a circuit split to eventually be
rectified by the United States Supreme Court.168
The short amount of time that passed between the AEPC II and Kivalina
decisions suggests that the Kivalina district court did not give enough
consideration to the Second Circuit’s persuasive legal reasoning in AEPC II.
At the time it came down, the AEPC II ruling was considered a sudden,
outlying decision in the field of global climate change litigation, and that in
some ways posed a barrier to the Kivalina litigation.169 The Kivalina court was
quick to dismiss Second Circuit’s reasoning as “sanguine,” and to note that
the AEPC II decision stood against a background of case law invoking the
political question doctrine in the “climate change as public nuisance”
context.170 Despite this, the Ninth Circuit now has the opportunity to give
greater weight to the reasoning of its sister circuit in finding that the
background of case law favors reversing the Northern District Court decision.
The Ninth Circuit has never addressed the political question doctrine
in this context before. The district court in Kivalina relied heavily on Corrie v.
Caterpillar,171 a fairly recent Ninth Circuit decision dismissing a case on
political question grounds. Corrie, however, is distinguishable from Kivalina
on the facts, and therefore will likely not pose as a barrier to plaintiffs on
appeal. In Corrie, an action was brought against bulldozer manufacturers by
family members of individuals whom had been killed or injured by
bulldozers, which had been paid for and supplied by the United States and
were used by Israeli Defense Forces to destroy homes in Palestine.172 The
court held that:
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Allowing this action to proceed would necessarily require the
judicial branch of our government to question the political
branches’ decision to grant extensive military aid to Israel. It is
difficult to see how we could impose liability [on the bulldozer
manufacturer] without at least implicitly deciding the propriety of
the United States’ decision to pay for the bulldozers which
allegedly killed the plaintiffs’ family members.173
The case explicitly called into question definitive acts by the United
States government in helping a foreign nation, and additionally the policy
surrounding those acts. As such, Corrie is distinguishable from Kivalina and
the related global warming cases, which rely on inaction by the political
branches and only have an incidental connection to foreign policy.

V.

Conclusion

No matter how the Ninth Circuit rules on Kivalina, it remains clear that
the decision will be highly influential in the environmental law community
and the general field of climate change analysis. If the Ninth Circuit reverses
the district court’s decision and follows the Second Circuit, there will be
significant legal consensus that public nuisance claims relating to climate
change do not pose nonjusticiable political questions. The potential impact
of that holding and subsequent consensus could spur Congress to action in
an effort to shape the regulatory schematics under which these claims could
be adjudicated. On the other hand, if the Ninth Circuit diverts from the
Second Circuit and upholds the district court’s dismissal, “it would
represent a major judicial schism over the largest environmental issue of
this century, and put pressure on the United States Supreme Court to mend
the rift.”174
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